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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j). In an Order dated February 25, 2014, the Utah Supreme Comi assigned this 
case to the Utah Court of Appeals. [February 25, 2014 Order attached as Addendum l]. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court err in summarily entering Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law over Plaintiffs' Objection without permitting the parties the 
opportunity to submit memoranda as permitted by Utah R. Civ. P. 7 and without entering 
a final order resolving Plaintiffs' Objection; consequently, does this Court lack 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal? 
Determinative Law: DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'! Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992); Regan v. Blount, 1999 UT App 154,978 P.2d 1051; H.O. v. State (State ex rel. 
S.O.), 2004 UT App 449; Utah R. Civ. P. 7; Utah R. App. P. 4. 
Standard of Review: C01Tectness: State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Drake v. 
Industrial Comm 'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997); Stangl v. Ernst Home Ctr., Inc., 948 
P.2d 356,360 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Preserved at R. 569-573. 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court err in finding that Plaintiffs did not prove mutual mistake 
by clear and convincing evidence? 
Determinative Law: Despain v. Despain, 855 P.2d 254, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993); Kirchgestner v. Denver & R. G. W.R.R., 118 Utah 20, 218 P.2d 685 (Utah 
1950); Robert Langston Ltd. v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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Standard of Review: Clearly erroneous: Despain v. Despain, 855 P.2d 254, 215 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 43 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Preserved at R. 504. 
Issue No. 3: Did the trial comt err in making ce1tain material findings of fact that are not 
supported in the trial record or elsewhere? 
Determinative Law: State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)· Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 
82, ~ 76, 100 P.3d 1177; United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain 
Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ~ 27, 140 P.3d 1200. 
Standard of Review: Clearly erroneous: ELM, Inc. v. MT. Enters., Inc ., 968 P .2d 861 , 
865 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
Prese1·ved at R. 504. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in Court Below: 
Plaintiffs filed this action in August, 2009 requesting equitable relief from a real 
estate purchase conh·act for certain real property located in Veyo, Utah (the "Property.') 
[R. l]. 1 Plaintiffs amended the complaint, adding several causes of action including 
mutual mistake, fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, unilateral mistake, and 
unjust enrichment. [R. 91]. The parties held a pretrial conference before the trial on May 
14, 2013. [R. 209]. Following the pretrial conference, the district comt heard dispositive 
motions. Thereafter the parties participated in judicial mediation. [R. 217- 378]. Unable 
1 References to the Trial Record are hereinafter designated with the initial "R" followed 
by the page number in brackets. 
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to resolve the case through mediation, the Parties participated in a two-day bench trial. 
[R. 503- 506]. After the bench trial, held on November 18 and 19, 2013, the trial comt 
issued an oral ruling finding that Plaintiffs had not established their claim of mutual 
mistake. [R. 506]. Paramount to its decision was the determination by the district comt 
that the Parties were "implied to know" at the time of the purchase that the Prope1ty was 
not buildable due to the zoning laws in effect. Id. [11/19/2013 TT: 193:8-15; 194:4-14].2 
Defendants then submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, on 
January 14, 2014. [R. 556-64]. Plaintiffs filed an Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law on January 21, 2014 arguing that Plaintiffs' Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law deviated significantly from the district court's actual verbal 
ruling from the bench. [R. 569-73]. Plaintiffs also requested a hearing on the matter. Id. 
However, two days after Plaintiffs filed their Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (sometimes referred to hereinafter as "Objection"), the district court 
signed the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law without permitting 
Defendants the opportunity to file a memorandum in opposition or Plaintiffs the 
opp01tunity to file a reply. The trial court signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law without waiting for the submission of a "request to submit for decision," and without 
scheduling a hearing for oral arguments. In fact, the trial court never issued a ruling on 
Plaintiffs' Objection at all. [R. 576-84]. 
2 References to the Trial Transcript are hereinafter designated by the date, the initials 
"TT" and the page and line number in brackets. All pages of the Trial Transcript cited in 
this Brief are attached as Addendum 2. 
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Statement of the Facts: 
1. This case involves the sale and purchase of an illegally subdivided lot identified as 
Lot 6, located at West 500 North, Veyo, Utah encompassing approximately 5 
acres. [R. 232]. In the early l 990's, Lot 6 was ii.legally subdivided into two 
parcels. Id. A home was built on the smaller 2-acre eastern parcel. Washington 
County Zoning ordinances imposed certain constrnction/building restrictions on 
the 3 .2 acre western parcel. Id 
2. In 2005, Defendant Catherine Arnett purchased the larger 3-acre western parcel 
("Prope11y"). Defendant Catherine Arnett bought the property so her daughter, 
Defendant Patricia Arnett could keep and train horses. [R. 263]. The Defendants 
had several intentions for the property, but abandoned those intentions when the 
Defendants learned that zoning restrictions on the Property limited the number of 
horses Patricia Arnett intended to keep on the land. The Defendants allege that 
they had no prior knowledge of the illegal subdivision and building restrictions 
imposed on the Prope1fy. [R. 237- 38]. 
3. In February, 2007, Kent Thurgood and Trudy Thurgood visited the Property; and 
spoke with Defendant Patricia Arnett. [R. 270- 71]. The Thurgoods are Plaintiff 
Brett Folk.man's in-laws. [11/18/2013 TT: 127:20]. 
4. During the meeting, the Thurgoods indicated to Patricia Arnett that the prope11y 
would be used: 1) to build residentia l homes; and 2) to build a road to connect to 
another development. [R. 272, 369-70]. 
5. Trudy Thurgood, on behalf of Plaintiff High Desert Estates, LLC ("HDE"), did 
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several things to perform "due diligence" on the Property, including: 
(1) Hiring a surveyor to properly survey the prope1iy. 
(2) Contacting Keith Jones, President of the Veyo Water Company to make 
sure that the water tapping could be used for homes on the property. Keith 
confirmed to Trudy Thurgood that the water could be so used. 
(3) Meeting with a representative of the local power company at the prope1iy 
and showing him the power box that Patricia Arnett had shown Trudy and 
Kent Thurgood. This meeting was scheduled in order to ascertain if the 
power box could be used as the power source for a home on the Property. 
(The representative of the local power company ultimately located a closer 
path for the electrical needs of the High Desert Property, but did suggest 
that the power box Patricia Arnett had shown to the Thurgoods be used for 
homes built on the Property.) 
[11/18/2013 TT: 200:3-201:4]. 
6. Trndy Thurgood also visited the Washington County Recorder ' s Office and 
located the original plat map for the Prope1iy. [11/18/2013 TT: 194:24-199:21]. 
Upon inspecting the map, Trndy Thurgood realized that the Property ( designated 
as "Lot 6") appeared significantly larger than the actual property site she had 
visited. Id. Trudy Thurgood subsequently learned from the owner of the eastern 
portion of Lot 6 that the lot had been subdivided, and a home built on the eastern 
portion. Id. 
7. Following this discovery, Trudy realized that the Property Patricia Arnett was 
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attempting to sell was only the western half of what was designated as Lot 6 on the 
plat map. Id. Trudy Thurgood was concerned about this fact because Lot 6 
appeared as an "unsubdivided lot" on the plat map. Id 
8. Trudy Thurgood returned to the Office of the Washington County Recorder, and 
explained her concerns to the county employee who was working there. Id In 
response to this inquiry, the county employee began to research the issue, and 
located a more recent plat map of the subdivision. Id. The county employee 
discovered an updated plat map that plainly indicated that Lot 6 was a subdivided 
lot. Id 
9. otably, the two official plat maps obtained from the Office of the Washington 
County Recorder were identical in all respects, save for the sole exception of a 
single line dividing Lot 6 into two distinct parcels. Id Nothing on either of the 
official maps differentiated the lots as being either legally or illegally subdivided. 
Id. 
10. In mid-2007, Defendant Catherine Arnett sold the Property to Plaintiff HOE. [R. 
296- 307]. One of the members of HOE- Plaintiff Brett Folkman- subsequently 
substituted himself in the place of HDE as the buyer of the Property. Id. 
11. At the time Catherine Arnett sold the Property to Plaintiffs, the Property was part 
of an illegally subdivided Lot 6. 
12. It is undisputed that neither Defendants nor Plaintiffs had actual knowledge that 
Lot 6 was illegally subdivided. [R. 237-38; 11/18/2013 TT: 106-07]. 
13 . Trudy Thurgood and Patricia Arnett were both aware that Plaintiffs had a two-fold 
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purpose in purchasing the Property: (1) to allow access for adjacent land and (2) to 
build on the Property. [11/18/2013 TT: 232:20-233:4; 11/19/2013 TT: 93:23-94:6; 
195:9-196:3]. 
14. Plaintiff Brett Folkman testified at trial that: 
(1) The price Plaintiffs paid for the Prope1ty ($225,000) was for a "buildable" 
lot and that raw, unbuildable land would have been significantly less 
expensive. [11 /18/2013 TT: 132:11-134:8]; 
(2) The appraisal provided by Defendant Patricia Arnett indicated that the 
Property was zoned for construction as a "residential lot" and that all 
comparables used in the appraisal were other "buildable" lots [11 /18/2013 
TT: 134:18-135:15]; 
(3) Plaintiffs obtained their own appraisal which was done as an approved lot 
for a single-family residence. [11 /18/2013 TT: 136:6-10]; 
( 4) Plaintiffs' appraisal indicated that "No apparent adverse easements or 
encroachments negatively affect the subject's value." [11/18/2013 TT: 
136: 14-16]. 
(5) Plaintiffs' appraisal also used comparables that were approved/buildable 
acreages in the area. [11 /18/2013 TT: 136:6-10]; 
( 6) Defendants' title insurance indicated that the Property was approved for 
building. [11/18/2013 TT: 181:21-25]; 
(7) The title policy obtained by Plaintiffs indicated that there were no problems 
affecting the ability to construct a residence on the Property. [11/18/2013 
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TT: 144:21-24]; 
(8) Plaintiffs relied on the appraisals, title reports, county records and 
Defendant Patricia Amett's statements in concluding that the Property was 
"buildable." [11/18/2013 TT: 157:3-1 3; 161:12-21]. 
15 . In early 2009, Plaintiff Brett Folkman began efforts to construct a home on the 
Property and discovered that the Property had been illegally subdivided and that 
there was a restriction against building construction. [R. 248-55]. 
16. After making this discovery, Plaintiff Folkman immediately contacted Patricia 
Arnett; informing her of the issue. Id. Defendants and Plaintiffs could not resolve 
the dispute and Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit. Id. 
17. In concluding that mutual mistake had not occurred, the trial court assumed that 
Trudy Thurgood, Plaintiff Brett Folkman and Defendant Patricia Arnett were 
"experienced" and "reasonably sophisticated" real estate investors-therefore, all 
parties were imputed with knowledge that the Property was not illegally 
subdivided and not "buildable" [11/19/2013 TT: 193-194]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUME T 
Plaintiffs present three arguments on appeal: 
(I) The trial court erred when it summarily adopted Defendants' Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law without allowing the Parties to 
submit the requisite memoranda under Utah R. Civ. P. 7 and without 
actually ruling on Plaintiffs' Objection to the Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions ofLaw. Plaintiffs' Objection should be substantively 
Page 12 of25 
treated as a Rule 52(b) motion which is still pending before the trial court. 
(2) In refusing to find that the Parties had made a "mutual mistake," the trial 
court erroneously imputed knowledge of the building restriction to the 
Parties even though the Parties testified that none of them were aware of 
the restriction. 
(3) There is no evidence in the record to support ce1iain findings of fact 
included in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred by failing to allow the Parties to submit memoranda on the 
Objection. The trial court also erred because it never issued a ruling addressing 
Plaintiffs ' Objection. 
After trial on this case, on January 14, 2014, Defendants filed Proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a proposed Judgment. [R. 556-565]. Plaintiffs filed 
their Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law seven days later on 
January 21, 2104. [R. 569-573]. In their Objection, Plaintiffs noted approximately 20 
different facts that Defendants had inserted into the Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law that were never mentioned in the district court's oral ruling. Plaintiffs 
also noted that the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law omitted facts 
related to Trudy Thurgood's designation of the property as "LR-6-A-NW." These omitted 
facts were highly relevant to the district court's imputation of knowledge by Plaintiffs of 
the restrictions on constrnction before they purchased the Property. [R. 570-71]. Finally, 
Plaintiffs objected to paragraph 2 of the "conclusions of law" section in the Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [R. 563] because the Court never ruled on or 
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discussed the issue of whether the capability of building on the Prope1ty was a material 
feature of the Parties' agreement. [R. 572]. Plaintiffs requested a hearing on their 
objections because the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law deviated 
materially from the trial court's actual ruling at the end of the trial. 3 
Only two days after Plaintiffs filed their Objection and without any paity having 
filed a request to submit for decision, the trial court signed the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment in the exact form as originally submitted by the 
Defendants. [R. 576-585] . Defendants were not given the opportunity to file a 
memorandum in opposition; nor were Plaintiffs allowed to file a reply memorandum. The 
trial court summarily signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law without setting 
a hearing on the matter (apparently ignoring Plaintiffs' request for such). 
"Regardless of how it is captioned, a motion filed within ten days of the entry of 
judgment that questions the correctness of the comt's findings and conclusions is 
properly treated as a post-judgment motion under either Rules 52(b) or 59(e). DeBry v. 
Fidelity Nat 'l Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520, 522-23 (Utah Ct. App . 1992); see also Reeves 
v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073, 288 Utah Adv. Rep. 11. "The timeliness of a Rule 52(b) or 
Rule 59 motion is governed by the rules themselves. Such motions must be served or 
filed not later than ten days after the entry of the judgment." Regan v. Blount, 1999 UT 
App 154, ~[ 6,978 P.2d 1051. "The phrase 'not later than' does not require that there be a 
pre-existing judgment, rather, it 'sets only a maximum period and does not nullify an 
3 These deviations are addressed in parts II and III of the "Argument" section of this 
Brief. 
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otherwise valid motion made before a formal judgment has been entered.'" Id. (internal 
citations omitted) . 
In the case H. 0. v. State (State ex rel. S. 0.) , 2004 UT App 449, a juvenile 
court terminated the appellant's parent rights. The juvenile comi issued findings, 
conclusions and an order. Subsequently, the appellant filed an objection to the findings, 
conclusions and order. The appellant then filed an appeal of the juvenile court's original 
findings, conclusion and order. Thereafter, the juvenile court entered amended findings, 
conclusions and an order. In dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction this Court 
rei terated the general rule that objections to findings of fact and conclusions of law are, in 
substance, Rule 52 or Rule 59 motions. The Court of Appeals then determined that 
because the appellant had filed his notice of appeal prior to the entry of the order 
resolving appellant's objection to the original findings, conclusions and order, the Court 
did not have jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. 
In the instant case, Plaintiffs filed their Objection and two days later, the trial court 
adopted the original Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by 
Defendants without any alteration. Unlike the appellant in the H. 0. v. State case, 
Plaintiffs did not preemptively file an appeal before an order disposing of the Objection 
was entered by the trial court. However, in the present case, the trial court never allowed 
for the filing of Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c) memoranda in opposition or in reply. The trial court 
ignored Plaintiffs ' request for a hearing and also signed the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Lmv without any party having submitted a "request to submit for 
decision." [See Utah R. Civ. P. 7 ( d)]. Perhaps most important! y, the trial court never 
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entered any order resolving Plaintiffs' Objection. 
The court in Regan v. Blount succinctly summarizes the jurisdictional issue in 
such cases as follows: 
An appeal may be taken from a district court from all final orders and 
judgments. See Utah R. App. P. 3(a). Absent a final order, the appellate 
court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal. See State v. Rawlings, 
829 P.2d 150, 153 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The finality of an order or 
judgment may be affected by certain post-trial motions. Specifically, under 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b ), a timely motion to alter or amend 
the judgment or for a new trial filed under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
52(b) and 59 suspends the finality of the challenged order or judgment 
rendering "a notice of appeal filed prior to disposition of such a motion by 
entTy of a signed order [ineffective] to confer jurisdiction on an appellate 
comt." Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999, 1000 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (per curiam) (citations omitted). To vest jurisdiction in the appellate 
court, the notice of appeal must be filed after entry of the order disposing of 
such motions. See Swenson Assoc. Architects v. State, 889 P.2d 415, 417 
(Utah 1994) . 
Regan v. Blount, 1999 UT App 154, ~j 4, 978 P.2d 1051 
As Plaintiffs have noted, objections to findings and conclusions are treated as Rule 
52 or Rule 59 motions. The language of current Rule 52(b) provides: 
Upon motion of a party made not later than 14 days after entry of judgment 
the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may 
amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion 
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in 
actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for 
judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
Plaintiffs field their Objection 7 days after Defendants filed their Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and prior to the trial court's adoption of the 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Objection (i.e. 
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"Rule 52 motion") was timely. Ultimately, Plaintiffs' Objection is still pending and 
remains unresolved. 
11. The trial court erred in finding Plaintiffs failed to prove mutual mistake by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
The trial com1 improperly, and without substantiating evidence, imputed 
knowledge to the parties that Lot 6 had been illegally subdivided. In order to show 
"mutual mistake" in Utah, Plaintiffs are required to demonstrate that "both pa11ies, at the 
time of contracting, share[ d] a misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon 
which they based their bargain." Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah App. 1992). 
A finding of "mutual mistake" requires that the mistaken fact be material , GeoNan 
Props., LLC v. Park-Ro-She, Inc., 2011 UT App 309, ~ 12; concern a past or existing fact 
-and not a future contingency, Deep Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State Arm01y Bd., 2008 
UT 3, ~ 17; and be established by clear and convincing evidence supp011ed by the "acts 
statements and conduct" of the parties. Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415,435 (1950). Every 
mutually mistaken fact must be a pat1 of the "contemplated purpose of the contract." Id. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court 's analysis in Harper, a prospective purchaser of 
real property need not conduct an extreme inspection, but through ordinary diligence may 
remain mistaken concerning a material fact regarding that property. Id. at 436. 
In this case, Plaintiffs demonstrated at trial that: (1) the ability to construct a 
residence on the Property was a material element of their decision to purchase the 
Prope11y [11/18/2013 TT: 133-34; 149-50]; (2) that both pat1ies knew that Plaintiffs 
wanted to build on the Property at the time the contract was fonned [11/18/2013 TT: 78-
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79]; (3) it was illegal to build on the Property at the time the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract was signed, [11/18/2013 TT: 100; 106-07; 114-18]; (4) neither party knew of 
the illegal status of the lot [11/18/3013 TT: 53; 83; 106-07; 136; 147; 11/19/2013 TT: 73, 
76-77, 94]; and (5) the patties fi rst discovered the illegal status when Plaintiffs applied 
for a building permit after purchasing the property from Defendants [11/18/2013 TT: 
100; 106-07; 114-18; 11/19/2013 TT: 73, 76-77, 94]. 
In refusing to find the existence of a mutual mistake, the trial court focused almost 
exclusively on the imputed knowledge of the Parties. The relevant statements of the trial 
court on imputed knowledge of the restriction are as follows: 
(1) Now, the Court is required to imply certain knowledge of process to the 
am1's length negotiations and acquisition of real estate. I can only look at 
this as arm's length because while counsel have both agreed that Mrs. 
Thurgood and Mr. Folkman are experienced real estate investors, Mrs. 
Arnett' s testimony also shows to me that this isn't her first rodeo either. 
[11/19/2013 TT: 193:8-15]. 
(2) "In order to fi nd a rescission of this contract under either a mutual mistake 
of fact or a unilateral mi stake of fact, the Court must find by clear and 
convincing evidence [ ... ] that the parties were not aware of the 
circumstances of this lot. The parties are implied to know what the 
recording is in the county recorder's office when they are reasonably 
sophisticated real estate people. And I would call Mrs. Arnett a reasonably 
sophisticated real estate person and Ms. Thurgood and Mr. [Folkman]." 
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[11/19/2013 TT: 193:19-194:9]. 
This finding is clearly erroneous because it imputes knowledge of the restriction 
on construction to the Parties despite the fact that all Parties indicated that they had no 
knowledge of such at the time the Real Estate Purchase Contract was signed. As clearly 
evidenced by the testimony of Plaintiff Brett Folkman, the appraisal provided by 
Defendants and Plaintiffs' own appraisal all relied on the assumption the Property was 
buildable based on the legal description of the Property. Furthermore, Defendants' title 
insurance and the title policy obtained by Plaintiffs indicated that the Property was zoned 
for residential building and did not identify any restriction on construction. Finally, 
Plaintiffs paid a premium price for the Property-a price that would have been 
significantly reduced if the Property was merely "raw" land. 
Given that the illegal subdivision status slipped through notice of the appraisers, 
title insurers and every person involved in the sale of the Property, the trial court 
wrongfully charged the Parties with knowledge of a fact they clearly did not have. 
Plaintiffs were reasonably entitled to rely upon the title insurance report, in any case. The 
trial court's conclusion must be viewed as clearly erroneous and therefore requires 
reversal. 
Plaintiffs have not been able to locate a single judicial decision in Utah where the 
elements of mutual mistake were defeated by an imputation of knowledge that the parties 
did not actually have. By its very nature, mutual mistake is an action in equity and relies 
upon the parties' subjective knowledge and intentions. When a material fact within that 
knowledge base is mistaken, the claim for rescission is proven. Plaintiffs urge this Court 
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to reverse the trial court; and find in Plaintiffs' favor on their claim for mutual mistake. 
Ill. The trial court erred in making certain material.findings of fact that were not 
supported in the trial record or elsewhere. 
In challenging certain findings of fact by the trial court, Plaintiffs are required to 
marshal the evidence. "In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists." Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, ~· 11 , 51 P.3d 724. "The challenging party 
must 'temporarily remove its own prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position'· 
he or she must play the 'devil's advocate."' Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, if 78, 100 P.3d 
1177 (citing Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 108, ~ 19, 57 P.3d 1093). "In sum, to properly 
marshal the evidence the challenging party must demonstrate how the court found the 
facts from the evidence and then explain why those findings contradict the clear weight 
of the evidence." Id. (citing Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse Inc., 872 
P.2d 1051, 1054 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). 
Challenged Findings of Fact: 
Finding of Fact o. 27: "Even if there were clear and convincing evidence of a mistake, 
there is not clear and convincing evidence that the mistake involved a basic assumption 
or vital fact upon which the parties based their bargain or that the mistake related to a 
material feature of the parties' agreement." [R. 581 ] 
a. "Plaintiffs purchased the Subject Property to serve as a conduit or second access 
to the High Desert Property. Indeed, sho1tly after the purchase, Folkman recorded 
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an easement over the Subject Property." [R. 581]. 
Evidence at [11/18/2013 TT: 134]. 
b. "The evidence preponderates, but is not clear and convincing, that Plaintiffs also 
contemplated building homes on the Subject Property or selling the Subject 
Property to someone else who would build homes on it." [R. 581]. 
Evidence at [11/18/2013 TT: 78-79; 133-34; 149-50; 163]. 
c. "At the time of the purchase, however, Plaintiffs' plans to build homes on the 
Subject Property did not necessarily require that the Subject Property be buildable 
'as is,' i.e., buildable without a zoning change or plat amendment. Indeed, at the 
time of purchase, one of the options that Plaintiffs had contemplated and believed 
to be viable was incorporating the Subject Property into the adjacent High Desert 
Property and then rezoning the Subject Property for housing. Another option that 
Plaintiffs had contemplated and believed to be viable was obtaining a plat 
amendment which would allow housing. These options are viable." [R. 581] . 
Evidence at [11/18/2013 TT: 78-79; 131-34; 225; 228; 234; 256-57; 272; 
11/18/2013 TT: 112-113]. 
d. Shortly after Folkman purchased the Subject Prope11y, Deon Goheen informed 
Trudy that residences could not be built on the Subject Property "as is" but that the 
Subject Property could be incorporated into the High Desert Property and rezoned 
to allow housing. Upon being told this, Trudy believed that the Subject Property 
would suit Plaintiffs' purposes. [R. 581]. 
Evidence at [11/18/2013 TT: 265-67; 249-52; 274]. 
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e. Thus, there is not clear and convincing evidence that a material feature or basic 
assumption of the parties' agreement was the Subject Property being buildable "as 
is," i.e., buildable without a plat amendment or zoning change. [R. 581]. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court's finding of fact No . 27 (and subparts) has 
mistakenly been listed as "finding of fact," but is actually a legal conclusion. 
Fmthennore, even if all of the subparts (a-e) are factually supportable by evidence in the 
record, these facts do not establish the general finding in No. 27 that "buildability" was 
not a basic assumption or vital fact upon which the parties based their bargain or that 
related to a material feature of the parties' agreement. Just because other options existed 
does not mean the "buildable" status of the lot was not a basic assumption both parties 
relied upon. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should find that the Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is sti11 outstanding and that the trial court failed 
to properly allow the Parties the opportunity to file their memoranda under Utah R. Civ. 
P. 7 or to consider and resolve the Objection by way of an order. This Court should 
further find that the elements of mutual mistake were met and that the trial court's 
imputation of knowledge as to the restTiction on construction was erroneous. On finding 
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Finally, the Comt should find that the trial court erred in making certain material 
findings of fact that were not supported in the h·ial record or elsewhere and reverse those 
factual findings. 
Respectfully submitted July 3, 2014. 
HEIDEMAN & ASSOCIATES 
JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
High Desert Estates, LLC and 
Brett Folkman 
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Addendum 1 
J\nhea 2K- ~.dinez 
®tth uf OJnud 
February 25, 2014 
JUSTIN R. ELSWICK 
JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN 
~uprBttt:e filuurf uf ~fa4 
450 foauilf ,>fob? ~met 
J.©- ~ ax 140210 
fonH ~hl? alitu, ~n:4 84114-0210 
J\ppr,llnfa ®ttks' @ffire 
~dep4one (BOl) 578-3!100 
~nx (ani) 578-39!1!1 
J611pnmte aloud ,e~ffon (801) 238-7967 
H EIDEMAN, MCKAY, HEUGL Y & OLSEN, LLC 
2696 N UNIVERSITY A VE STE 180 
PROVO UT 84604 
~4:efu ~- ~u:mmf 
(!lquf Justice 
~11111.h: ~- ~1!4rin_g 
._i\,,gocu,b ®tirf ;Jusfu-,: 
©:4ri11fin:e c#I[. ~urlp1m 
;Jnma 
RE: High Desert v. Arnett Appellate Case No. 20140146 
Dear Mr. ELSWICK: 
Please be advised that the notice of appeal in this case has been filed with the Utah 
Supreme Court. The case number is 20140146 and should be indicated on any future 
filings or correspondence. 
Effective November 1, 2011, Rule 24(£) has changed to a Type-Volume Limitation and 
requires a Certificate of Compliance with Rule 24(£)(1). Please review the rule to 
ensure compliance with the rule change. 
Included with this notice is an order transferring the case to the Utah Court of 
Appeals within twenty days. The order remains in effect, unless, within 10 calendar 
days of the date of the order letters are received advising the Supreme Court why 
they should retain the case. 
Rule ll(e)(l) of the Utah Rul es of Appellate Procedure requires that, within ten days of 
the filing of the notice of appeal, appel1ant must submit a transcript request for such 
parts of the proceedings as the appellant deems necessary. 
Transcripts may be ordered on line by going to the court's web site at 
www.utcourts.gov. Under Online Services, select Reqliest a Transcript. 
The State Transcript Coo:rdinator, Crystal Cragun, may be reached at either (801)~r573:a:• 
3948 or crysta1c@utcourts.gov. 
This co_urt will permit documents of 10 pages (including attachments) or less that do not 
require a filing fee to be filed by fax. The faxed document, which must bear a facsimile 
of the required signature, will be accepted as an "original" document until the true 
original and any required copies are received by the court. The original must be 
received by this court within 5 business days from the date of the transmission by fax. If 
the original is not received within that period, the court will treat the filing as void. A 
faxed filing is considered "received" when stamped by the clerk's office. The time for 
stamping is limited to regular office hours (weekdays, 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.). All risks 
associated with filing by fax are borne by the sender. The fax number for this court is 
(801) 578-3999. 
The Docketing Statement and attachments, consisting of the original and nvo copies, is 
due within 21 days of the filing of the notice of in the trial court. Therefore, the 
docketing statement is due March 6, 2014. 
Please note, failure to perfect an appeal at any time during the appeal process may 
result in dismissal of the appeal. 
Sincerely, 
~ -;Yfz,,;,d,/;,ccJ/~~,,-z.e,,vl c{_ 
Merilyn Hammond 
Judicial Assistant 
cc: N ADAM CALDWELL 
FIFTH DISTRICT, ST GEORGE, 090502405 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF UTAH 
High Desert Estates, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company; and 
Brett Folkman, an individual; 
Plaintiffs and Appellan ts, 
V. 
Patricia Arnett, an individual; and 
Catherine Arnett, an individual; 
---00000-
Case No. 20140146-SC 
090502405 
Defendants and Appe1lees. 
ORDER 
JAN 1 4 2014 
Pursuan t to rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this matter will be 
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition unless a timely request for 
retention (as detailed below) is received. This order may also be superseded by another 
order directing an immediate transfer if the Court deems such a transfer to be 
appropriate. Following transfer, all further pleadings and correspondence should be 
directed to the Court of Appeals. 
Within ten calendar days of the date of this order, any party to the appeal may submit a 
letter to the Supreme Court concerning the appropriateness of retaining the matter on 
its own docket. The letter may request retention or may request transfer. The letter 
shall contain the following four categories of information, preceded by a heading 
describing each category: 
1. The name of the case and the appellate case number, 
2. The narnes of all parties invo]ved in the case and the attorneys and firms 
representing the parties, 
3. A concise statement of the issues presented on appeal, and 
4. A brief explanation of the reasons su pporting retention or transfer. 
The Checklist for Appellate Jurisdiction (included with notice of this order) must also 
be completed and returned with any letter requesting retention. Failure to complete 
and retu1n the checklist will preclude consideration of a request for retention. 
The letter and checklist may not be combined with any other document or pleading. 
The letter shall not exceed five pages (excluding the checklist) and must be received 
within ten calendar days of the date of this order. The Court will not consider any 
letter requesting retention that is received after the ten-day deadline. In the event the 
deadline falls on a weekend or holiday, the letter must be received by the first business 
day thereafter. 
Any response to a timely letter requesting retention must be filed with this Court within 
seven calendar days of service of that letter. The response may not exceed five pages. 
In the event the matter is transferred by superseding order prior to expiration of the 
deadline, an otherwise timely request for retention will be treated as a request for recall 
from the Court of Appeals. 
FOR THE COURT: 
~ AldreaRMartinez 
Clerk of Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on February cQ'L, 2014, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing 
to be delivered to: 
N ADAM CALDWELL 
SNOW JENSEN & REECE 
912 \t\T 1600 S STE 200 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN 
JUSTIN R ELSWICK 
HEIDEMAN MCKAY HEUGL Y & OLSEN LLC 
2696 N UNIVERSITY A VE STE 180 
PROVO UT 84604 
FIFTH DISTRICT, ST GEORGE 
A TIN: CAROL CAMACHO 
206 \t\1 TABERNACLE STE 100 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
By 121: i? 4t~ d-b&hcnd)«J 
Merilyn Ham1 nd ( 
Judicial Assistant 
Case No. 20140146-SC 
FJfTH DISTRICT, ST GEORGE, 090502405 
Checklist for Appellate Jurisdiction 
(If a request for retention is submitted, this form must be returned with that request and must provide all applicable 
information or the request for retention will 11ot be considered by the Court. Any additional information relevant to 
jurisdiction may be included in the letter requesting retention) 
The case number in the lower court _______ _ 
The date the final judgment was entered or, if the time for appeal was reinstated pursuant to Subparts (f) 
or (g) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the date of reinstatement _________ _ 
The date of the filing of the appeal to which this reten tion request is directed _ _____ ___ _ 
Whether any other appeals or cross-appeals in the same case ha ve been fi led: Yes 
The date(s) of those appeal(s) 
No _ _ 
Whether the judgment l.isted above resolved the case as to all claims and parties: Yes No 
lf no, whether the judgment was certified as fina l pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure: Yes No . List the date of certification _________ _ 
Whether the judgment listed above included a ruling concerning attorney fees: Yes No 
If attorney fees were awarded at any time, whether the amounts of all awards of fees were fixed prior to 
the date of your latest appeal: Yes __ No__ Not Applicable __ . Lis t the date of the last order 
fi xing the fees: _ ______ __ _ 
Whether Rule 4(6) of the Ru les of Appellate Prncedure is appl icable: Yes No 
If yes, list the da te of any motion listed in Rule 4(6) __________ and the date of 
resolution of that motion _ ______ __ _ 
Whether Rule 4(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure is applicable: Yes No 
Whether Rule 7(f)(2) of the Ru les of Civil Procedure has been sat isfied (see CUWCD. v. King, 2013 UT 13): 
Yes _ _ No __ No t Applicable __ . 
If yes, list the date of the order satisfy ing Ru le 7(f)(2) ________ _ 
H no, list <1ny act ions that have been taken to comply with the requ irements of Rule 7(£)(2): 
Whether the ti me to file the appeal was ex tended: Yes _ _ No __ . List the date of any motion for 
an extension ________ and the da te of the order ex tending the time _ ________ _ 
Whether your appeal was filed pursuant to Uta h Code§ 7813-1 1-129: Yes No If yes, list the 
subsection(s) of that provision that is (are) applicable: _ _ _ _ _ 
The statu tory provision conferring appellate jurisdiction on this Court - ie., the applicable subsecti on of 
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the curb and gutter and build a road, and he said all 
of that would cost about $80,000, it wasn't 
financially feasible to go through all that effort 
when I still could only have 12 horses and I had 28. 
Q. Did the engineer ever indicate to you that 




Did the county or the planning and zoning 
or anyone in any government capacity -- let me 
rephrase. That's a compound question. 
Did Deon ever tell you that there was a 





No, because that wasn't our discussion. 
Okay. 
We only discussed horses. 
Did anyone in any government capacity ever 
tell you there was a problem with the buildability of 
this lot ? 
A. Only when I spoke to Deon after Brett sent 





-- in April of 2009. 
Now, I'm going to jump forward in time 
just a lit tle bit because I want to deal with the map 
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A. They wanted to know where the utilities 
were, and I showed them the water line and I showed 
them where the powers were -- the power lines were . 
Q. Was there anything else that they asked 
about? 
A. Yes. They asked about boundaries, and I 
told them I had not had it surveyed so I didn't know 
what the exact boundaries were. 
Q. 
A. 
Anything else ? 
Yes. I showed them those perc test 
disturbances in the property. 
They didn't want to walk the entire 
property, so I did inform them at the time that at 
the back o f the property along the north fence line 
that I had buried two horses there. And I recall 
specifically that conversation because they had not 
decided where they would put the road in, and I was 
concerned that they know that prior to them doing any 
construction, that they could possibly run into that. 
Q. Now, they also asked you about building on 
t he property, r ight? 
A. They did. 
Q. And they asked you about subdividing the 
property, correct? 
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The -- the question was , "How many homes do you think 
I can put on the property?" 
Q. Okay. Did -- did you understand that you 
could build more than one home on a lot? 
A. I explained that it was RA-1 , but I told 
her what she could do under that related to what she 
wanted to do, but she needed to contact the county. 
Q . And, in fact , during that entire 
conversation, your -- in your deposition, you 
testified that there was never a conversation about 
an easement during that meeting , correct? 
A. 
Q. 
Would you restate that question? 
Sure . 
During your telephone call, you spoke 
about the easement. But during the meeting on the 
property , there was no reference whatsoever to an 








No. It was --
That's not what you --
-- all about building the road . 
That ' s not what you testified to . 
Okay. 
Let's have you turn to page 66 of your 
Now , on page 66, you' re being asked about 
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Q. Why would they need access to water --
culinary water for a road? 
MR. CALDWELL: Objection , calls for 
speculation. 
THE WITNESS : I have no idea. 
Q. (By Mr. Heideman) Do --
THE COURT : Counsel , the objection is 
overruled. The answer will stand. 
Next question. 
MR. HEIDEMAN : Thank you. 
Q. (By Mr. Heideman) Following -- or, how 
long did this meeting last? 
A. 
Q. 
I'd say 30 minutes. 
Okay . Did you instruct them that they 





And did - - in fact, the reason you asked 
or, told them to talk to the county is 
because you weren ' t sure how many houses they could 
get on the property in light of the fact that some of 
it was going to be a road; is that correct? 
A . Right. And whether they could even put a 
house on it , given -- I had no idea what size of a 
road they would require and whether there would be 
any property left to put a house on, or houses. 
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i mmediately scrapped it. 
than that." 
I didn't go any further 
Q. 
A. 
That's your continuation on line 1. 
" So I don't know why -- I don't -- I would 
not say that I left that impression." 
Q. "Where did the number of three subdivided 
parcels come from?" 
A. "Because it was RA-1 and there was three 
acres, you wou l d then deduce the other possibility of 
being able to put three homes. But you also have to 
pu t in a road, so maybe you cou l dn ' t put in three 
homes. That's why you have to go to the county and 
get an engineer and have them work out all those 
numbe r s." 
Q. All right. Let's leave those 
conversa t ions for just a moment and let me ask you 
some very genera l topics. I've danced around the 
head of this pin a little b i t, and let me get right 
t o the point. Did you ever make any inquiries as to 
whe t her or not the subdivision on parcel 6 that you 
discovered was a l egal subdivision? 
A. 
Q. 
Did I ever investigate? No, I did not. 
Okay. Were you ever told by anyone that 
that subdivision was an il l egal subdivision? 
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the property to be buildable. Is that your 
understanding? 
A. I understood it to be buildable in terms 
of whatever process you had to go through the county. 
Q. Okay. But you didn't understand there to 
be any restrictions that would make the lot illegal 
for construction, correct? 
A. 
Q. 
I didn't look at it in those terms. 
Well, the question is pretty specific. 
Did you understand that it was illegally subdivided 
when you sold it? Did you know that? 
A. Well, once again, it's not that term. I 
mean, you all are coming up with this "illegally 
subdivided" term, and that's not really proper. 
Q. Unfortunately, ma'am, that's the question 
you have to answer. Did you understand that the 





And, in fact, that's consistent with 
paragraph 7(d) of the Real Estate Purchase Contract 
which says that as a seller, you' re required to 
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And is it your understanding that the 
first time that was discovered by Mr. Folkman was 
associated with this particular e-mail we've just 
reviewed in 2009? 
A. No, that's not my understanding. 
Q. Okay. When do you understand that 
Mr. Folkman do you have a date that you understand 







And what is that date? 
Around December or January 2008, 2009. 
Okay. So it would have been after -- well 





Okay. So you don't dispute, then, that my 
clients had no knowledge at the time of buying the 
property that this illegality existed. You don ' t 
d i spute that . 
A. 
Q. 
I don't dispute that. 
I ' m going to ask you to look at Exhibit 
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Okay. And it's being sent to Brett 
Yes. 
It was also copied to you; is that 
Yes. 
Okay. And so 
MR. CALDWELL: Your Honor, I'm just going 
to object as far as it's asking my client to testify 
about an e-mail that she's not involved in. This is 
going from a third party to the plaintiff. It does 
not involve my client. 
THE COURT: Well, counsel, the exhibit is 
in the record now. Let's find out if this is 
something that she looked at or did something about. 
MR. HEIDEMAN: That's what I was getting 
to. 
Q. (By Mr. Heideman) You received this 
e-mail, correct? 
A. I think so, yeah. 
Q. Okay. And what did you do in -- and for 
purposes of the record, I '11 represent that the 
e-mail indicates from Ms. Goheen that, "The Lava 
Ridge Subdivision has been split illegally" 
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amendment." 
The question that I have is, what did you 
do when you received this e-mail? 
A. I called Deon and verified the 
information. And then --
Q. Did you verify she sent it? 
A. No , I just verified her information and 
asked her, based on that information , what was 
involved in doing the plat amendment. 
Q. Okay. And did she simply reiterate what 





What else did she tell you? 
She told me that you ' d have to do a plat 
amendment, whether it would be for one house or three 
houses, and that involved getting a letter from the 
Water Conservancy District that they would approve 
the water for septic. And then you go and get a 
septic permit , and then you get an engine -- it's 
either engineer or architect , but she gave me the 
name of the fellow that actually put the whole Lava 
Ridge Subdivision together. She told me to contact 
him, and then he could do that plat amendment, and 
then you would submit that to the county and they 
would approve it -- she said the key to that was 
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getting that letter from the Water Conservancy 
District. As long as they provided that letter, 
everything else should go through without a hitch. 
Q. And the problem with -- or, the reason for 
the Water Conservancy District is because the size of 
the lots was difficult associated with the septic 





Okay. Why was that the key to the letter? 
The what the Water Conservancy District 
explained to me is they only have eight shares of 
water left in the Veyo region. And so they' re very 
particular about what they're going to allow them to 
be used for, and they had some very specific rules 
about that that were created -- I think it was 1999. 
And you had to go through some kind of process 
related to those rules. 
Q. Irrespectively, you don't disagree that 
you confirmed Deon's representation, Ms. Goheen's 
representation, that the lot was illegally split and 




Say the first part of the question. 
Sure. Irrespective of your understanding, 




























High Desert v. Arnett * November 18, 2013 117 
lot number 6 was -- had been illegally split , and 
that it was an unbuildable lot. 
Q. 
conclusion. 
MR. CALDWELL: Objection. 
(By Mr. Heideman) Is that correct? 
MR. CALDWELL : Cal ls for a legal 
MR. HEIDEMAN: 
understanding. 
I'm asking if that's her 
THE COURT: How does that call 
MR. CALDWELL : Well , plus it's mixing 
it's mi x ing the issue of the zoning with -- with the 
division . Thos e two don't necessarily go together. 
And so he's asking my client to basically conclude --
we're basically mi x ing apples and oranges in asking 
for -- for her understanding as to whether or not the 
lot can be built upon on, going back to because of 
the illegal subdivision wh e n it -- when it -- the 
argument that it goes to the zon i ng issues, not the 
actual subdivi s ion i tself. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I guess the real 
question I have is whether or not Washington County's 
position on the , let's go to that word 
"buildability, " of this lot, whether or not 
Washington Coun t y ' s po s ition on that issue is 
pertinent at all to Ms. Arnett's understanding . 
CITICOURT, LLC 
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Don't you just want to know if she knew what 
Washington County said about it? 
MR. HEIDEMAN: That's right. And maybe I 
asked the question poorly. Let me re-ask it, your 
Honor, because that's what I'm driving at . 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection and 
see if we can start over. 
Q. (By Mr. Heideman) You called and 




So your understanding was that Washington 
County would not issue a building permit for this 




In its current status, yes. 
That's what I was after. 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. HEIDEMAN: Your Honor, I have no 
further questions at this time. 
THE COURT: Counsel, let me give you the 
opportunity to tell me how you want to do this . Do 
you want to go into the cross-examination now even 
though she's your witness, we'll allow you to lead, 
unless (inaudible) -- or do you want to go ahead and 
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it was just raw land. Obviously raw land isn't worth 
very much compared to a buildable lot . Zoning 
restrictions for type of structure that could be 
built; water issues, what type of water would be 
required depending on what area you were in, whether 
that's -- you're going to have a well or tap into an 
existing culinary water system. So things of that 
nature. 
Q. How many years have you been engaged in 




Mr. Folkman, let ' s take you to the 
substance of this particular transaction . When did 
you become interested in what we've identified as the 
Veyo property or lot 6? 
A. 
Q. 
In 2005 . 
And what caused you to be interested in 
this particular l ot? 
A. I had - - I'd recently moved to Utah , and 
speaking with my in laws that I'd like to do some 
real estat e development in the St. George area and 
asked them to start looking for some property that we 
could develop . I was looking at -- also looking out 
for duple x/ fourple x type t hings. And that ' s when 
Kent and Trudy di s covered the - - it's actually 48.25 
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A. So it involved looking at the map and 
seeing who -- what owners had property adjacent to 
the 48.25 acres and talk to them. 
Kent and Trudy did -- did all the work . I 
was living in Northern Utah, but to see who would 
grant access. It only required a SO-foot easement, 
which wouldn't impair anyone's property and still 
allow full buildability of the rest of all of their 
property, but no one was willing to grant a 50-foot 
easement. 
Q. So, in fact, you were unable to get that 





And at some point, did you give up on just 
getting the easement itself? 
A. No. We decided, well, there were two 
parcels that we could actually buy. The thought 
process being, you know, I was going to offer them, 
like, $25,000 for an easement. I could actually buy 
one of these buildable lots, record the easement and 
either sell off the -- the lot that would be 
buildable to someone else. And part of that 
transaction I'd already have my easement entitled, so 
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sell the home, really try to reduce the cost that was 
putting us into the easement. Or we could take that 
property and include it as part of the larger parcel 
at some future point. None of that was determined, 
other than we knew we would get value out of that 
property. 
Q. Have you ever bought law -- excuse me. 
Have you ever purchased raw ground before? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And how often? 
A. Actually, the 48.25 acres and the 20 acres 
is raw land. And it's $10,000 an acre when you buy 
raw land because it's not worth anything because you 
can't build on it. 
Q. So the project that you're engaging in was 
a raw land purchase. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you paid, I'm sorry? 




Is that what you paid for this parcel? 
I paid $225,000, or $75 , 000 an acre, 
because it's a buildable lot and you can build a 
single family home on it, as indicated in the 
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purchased, as well as the appraisal I received . And 
I received a loan on the property from Deseret First 
Credit Union as -- to build a second family home in 
my personal name. 
Q. Now, Mr. Folkman, let me break down that 
answer. 
You heard -- were you in the courtroom 




And you heard them say that getting this 
easem e nt was what you were after , that build -- or, 
putti ng this -- these three lots and wrapping them 
into your development was not really the focus. 
When you pay for something, the value of 
the contract -- would you agree with me that the 
value of the contract is based on the value of the 




And so was it your i ntention to 
pay $75 , 000 per l ot for raw ground when you bought it 
for $10,000 above? 
A. Absolutely not. My purpose in 
acquiring - - purchasing land would, number one, allow 
me to have an easement; bu t number two, to recoup the 
value of having to do that easement by either selling 
CI TI COURT, LLC 
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off the remaining buildable portion or building a 
home and selling it , which I've done in the past, or 
including it in the subdivision. 
I -- obviously spending that much money, 
almost, what, eight times as much as I could go buy 
raw land for, I definitely planned on getting value 
out of the buildability of that lot. And that was my 
intention in purchasing the property. 
Q. And make no mistake , getting the easement 
was an important portion of the purchase. 
A. Absolutely. That was definitely a 
deciding factor in deciding to purchase property. 
But that was not the only decision because I would 
never spend more than, you know, $25,000 for a 
SO-foot right-of-way. 
Q. Mr . Folkman, when you went to - - well , let 
me -- l et me back up to your answer again. 
You indicated you received a copy of an 





And when did you receive that ? 
After we signed the real estate purchase 
agreement before we closed on the property . 
Q. Okay. 
March and July. 
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A. 
Q. 
did you do? 
A. 
That's correct. 
All right. And when you received it, what 
I looked at the appraisal, wanted to 
verify that, you know, it's buildable. It was coded 
R-1. It said best use was residential lot. It even 
said on the appraisal that there were no issue with 
the zoning. So everything looked great. You know, 
verifying the acreage, the comparables in terms of 
other buildable lots that it was compared with, and 
it was an appraisal for $175,000. 
So I basically verified that, yeah, I 
could buy this, I could go build a home on it, I 
could create my little 50-foot easement and 
everything will be great. 
Q. Now, did you also obtain an appraisal 
before making the purchase? 
A. Yes. I was required to get an appraisal 
because I was financing this property through Deseret 
Credit Union. 
Q. All right. I'd like to turn Exhibit 7, 
Bates number 180 . There we go. Is this the land 
appraisal report -- there we go. Is this the land 
appraisal report that you ordered? 
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Q. Okay . Let's talk just a little bit about 
this report. I'd like you to look underneath the 
comments section. And I've got the tracker on it. 
Tell me a little bit about this particular parcel in 
terms of how it was appraised . 
A. So this -- this appraisal was done as an 
approved lot in a subdivision ready to build a single 
family residence. So the bank and all their due 
diligence and the appraiser was viewing this lot as 
for me to build a second home. 
Q. And I'd like you to look down at the 
bottom of the page, and you'll see under the comments 
section. What ' s noted there? 
A. "No apparent adverse easements or 
encroachments negatively affect the subject's the 
value." 
Q. So when the appraisal was issued , were you 
made aware or given notice in any way of a problem 




Now, you'll note that there were 





What type of properties are these 
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Wells Fargo. 
Wells Fargo. 
And those are all now paid? 
That's correct . 
When you -- before closing on the 
transaction and during your conversation with 
Ms. Arnett, did you conduct an investigation into the 
property? 
A. I did not conduct a detailed investigation 
into the property, other than relying on the people 
that I was paying to do that, like the appraiser, the 
title company. We -- I did have a lot of phone 
conversations with Kent and Trudy, who were basically 
acting on my behalf, who were physically present and 
going through those conversations. So they reported 
back everything that was said. 
Q. Well , and, in fact, you received a title 
policy on this, right? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I did. 
And the title policy indicated that there 
were no problems with the subdivision or the 
property , correct? 
A. That's correct. And I also receiv ed --
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Q. I'd like you to turn to Exhibit 4. We 
read an e-mail string with Ms . Arnett. And the 
e-mail that I'm referring to specifically is on 
Bates 15. It's the first page of that exhibit. And 
it's the February 19, 2009 e-mail. 
When it says - - when she said, No other 
issues I know of if a single family home," what did 
you understand that to mean? 
A. That the lot was fully buildable, and I 
also understood that in phone conversations with her 
before I bought the lot. 
Q. Before you purchased the lot, had you 
asked her that question? 
A. I don't think I ever came right out and 
said, "Is the lot buildable?" But I discussed that I 
was going to put an easement on it, as well as build 
something on it. 
Q. Under Exhibit Number 1, which is the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract, under 7, seller 
disclosures, 7 (d), it indicates that, "A written 
notice of any claims and/or conditions known to 
seller relating to environmental problems and 
building or zoning code violations," that that has to 
be delivered to you. Did you ever receive a document 
indicating that there was a problem? 
CITICOURT, LLC 































And it - - you re - - you reviewed this 




And did you find any exceptions associated 




Okay. But you did note "and excepting 
there from the east, one 20-foot portion of lot 6." 





What did you take that to mean? 
That it was a three-acre lot, not a 
five-acre lot. 
Q. And that was pursuant to your 




Let's just ask the seminal question. Was 
it material to your purchase and when I say 
"material," was it important to your purchase -- let 
me ask the question differently. 
Would you have bought this lot if you had 
known you couldn't build a house on it? 
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bought the lot, I would have paid 30, $40,000 for it, 
which is what I paid for the other land that I had in 
the area that is not buildable. 
Q. So the statement -- let me -- let me make 
sure I understand your testimony. And maybe I 
phrased the question wrong. Is it your testimony 
that you may have bought this lot but you wouldn't 





MR. HEIDEMAN: Just a moment while I check 
my notes, your Honor, and make sure I hit everything. 
THE COURT: Certainly, Counsel. 
MR. HEIDEMAN: Your Honor, no further 
questions for this witness. 
THE COURT: You may cross, Counsel. 
MR. CALDWELL: Your Honor, I guess I'm 
just -- before I start, just a question as far as 
whether we want to break now or whether your Honor 
for lunch, or whether your Honor wants to 
THE COURT: It depends on how long you' re 
going to take, counsel. 
MR. CALDWELL: I -- I was just thinking --
THE COURT: I was shooting for around 12, 
12:10, somewhere in there. 
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zoned a legally buildable lot, that I could just go 
build on it. 
I reviewed the title insurance, also 
relying on that expert. 
I then also had to hire and pay for my own 
professional appraiser who came out with the same 
conclusion, that it was a buildable lot with no 
issues. 
I also had to pay for title insurance, so 
relied on yet another professional to give me the 
same opinion. And looked at the county records 
myself and felt a hundred percent satisfied that it 
was completely buildable. 
Q. At the time of the negotiations for the 
purchase of the Arnett property, you weren't living 





Okay. And so the initial meeting with --
let's start with the very first contact. 
Ms. Thurgood apprised you of the initial phone 





And that she then informed you as to the 
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Q. -- might not be buildable. But my 
question is, then why would you be asking Ms. Arnett 
as to the buildability of the property? 
A. I asked Ms. Arnett -- and I'd be happy to 
review the e-mail exchange again if you'd like to 
pull it up. I did not ask her if it was buildable 
when I e-mailed her. I asked her what her house 
plans were and if she'd already applied for a septic. 
I did not ask her until I found out afterwards that 




I had assumed it was buildable , relying on 
both county professionals and professionals in the 
appraisal and title insurance industries. 
Q. Okay. So you weren't relying on 





no issues of 
buildability 
had said she 
thought and 
I - -
-- it was just the conversations in two 
I relied on her statements that there were 
i t being buildable. The question around 
had to revolve around I knew that she 
bought a larger portion than what she 
there were problems and trying to 
understand what that was all about to make sure there 
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A. I actually have no idea why we're even 
talking about High Desert Estates and the development 
and what the reason was. 
has no material bearing. 
It has -- in my view, it 
I spent $225,000 that I borrowed a hundred 
percent of to have a buildable lot in an approved 
subdivision. I was going to use an easement and then 
either build a home or sell it off to recoup my 
money. 
I personally, not being an attorney , have 
no idea why High Desert Estates has any bearing at 
all on a purchase contract between myself , Brett 
Folkman. I signed, I paid. High Desert Estates had 
nothing to do with the financial closing of the 
transaction . That was all done before we closed . 
went to either go build or sell the property and 
found out it's not buildable. 
I - - I'm at a loss on why we 'r e even 
talking about High Desert Estates , other than the 
easement portion , but that ' s not really the focus. 
I bought what the county told me was an 
approved lot , what Patty's apprai s er said was an 
approved lot, what Patty ' s tit l e insurance said was 
I 
an approved lot , both documents which she sent to me 
prior to closing. I then hi red my own appraiser, my 
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Q. What differences would you identify from 
what she had pointed out? 
A. We were probably - - we were there in the 
afternoon. I wanted to wait 'til my husband was 
finished. And I think we met her there when she was 
feeding the horses. And I wanted my husband to be 
with me. And we probably talked for 45 minutes on 
lots of different things. We both have horses in 
common, we enjoy hor ses . So we talked a lot - - about 
a lot of different things. 
We never -- I never told her that we were 
going to have 200 homes there. I -- we had done 
enough due diligence before that as far as getting 
through the -- going working with the planning 
commission to know that we'd have to have way too 
much water, and it was pretty -- it ' s pretty scarce 
up there. So we thought 60 was probably the most 
that we could ever hope fo r . 
Q. Okay. And after that first meeting at the 
property, what kind of investiga tion did you do after 




Into purchasi ng the Arnett property? 
Yes. I nto purchasing the property. 
Okay . So I realized that we needed to get 
maps, so I went down to the county, got the maps. 
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And I arranged - - I. my se lf, looked through the maps. 
They have an access that you can get yourself. 





- - just on my own. I got home with it and 
realized that it was a five-acre parcel that was 
showing up on the map, and that we were only wanting 






So what did you do - -
I realized there was a big problem 
So what did you do then? 
And so I immediately called Cathy 
Patty, I mean, and we talked about that. 
I says, "We've got a problem here. You 
know. your name's not even on this and it shows it's 
five acres. You know, are you sure we have something 




Did Patty say -- what was her response? 
She sa i d , "You must have the wrong map." 
And so I went back to the county the next 
day, and this t ime I decided to not try to prove how 
smart I was by finding it myself. I went to the desk 
and I said, "I need to have the most current map of 
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Lava Ridge Subdivision . " 
And so the lady was gone for a while, and 
she brought back the - - the other map that shows the 
line dividing the two. So you have lot 6A and lot 
6B. And - -
THE COURT: Co unse l , do you have your 
larger 18 - by-18 map over there? 
MR. HEIDEMAN: I do, your Honor. 
THE COUR T: Counsel, why do n 't you come on 
up to Ms. Thurgood. And , please, Mr. Caldwell, let's 
huddle around here. 
THE WITNESS : I kind of feel like I'm 
flaying football. 
THE COURT: Now --
THE WITNESS : Yes? 
THE COURT: - - did the map that you were 
shown at the county recorder's offic e have any 
resemb l ance to this at all? 
th i s part, 







i s correct . 
COUR T : The division of 
WITNESS : Yes. 
COURT: - - did show - -
WITNESS : It d i d show 
COURT: - - on the map? 
CI TI COURT, LLC 
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THE WITNESS: 
(affirmative), 1 i ke that. 
- - lot. Uh-huh 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, the next question 
I have for you relates to this Exhibit Number 3 that 
we've received into evidence. And that is the one 
that you've heard Mr. Folkman talk about that he 
thought had got faxed from you. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you recall faxing a 
different map than this one to Mr. Folkman that had 
signature l ines and things like you see on that 
document that counsel put there in front of you? Do 
you have any recollection of that kind of document? 
THE WITNESS: 
which one I sent to him. 
I'm sorry, I don't remember 
THE COURT: Okay. The reason I ask you --
and this is (inaudible), but I'm the one who's gotta 
know, so 
THE WITNESS : Yes. 
THE COURT: -- you can tell me. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
TH E COURT: The smaller sheet t hat you 
ha ve, the letter-sized sheet, it appears as though it 
ha s been prepared as an official plat map as an 
amendment to the origina l plat map that had the five 
CI TI COURT, LL C 
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acre -- well, the 4.3 acre lot on it. The one that 
you have there is performed -- or, is formatted --
that's a good word to use - - formatted as though it 
is ready for a s i gnature to be recorded. It has the 
lines on it for a signature by the county recorder's 
office and all t he people who have to approve it, the 
planning commission and all of those, before it can 
be recorded. Do you have any recollection if the 
document that you received f r om the county recorder's 
office had any of those s i gnature lines on it or 
anything like that? 
THE WITNESS: I do remember something now. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Go ahead, tel 1 me 
what you remember. 
THE WITNESS: I remember going through all 
my records last night and finding that map that you 
just showed me where I had - - it was in pieces. I 
folded i t and refolded it so many times, it became my 
working copy. And I believe that that is the one 






COURT: The one that has 
WITNESS : - - at the - -
COURT: - - no signature lines on 
WITNESS: That had no signat u re 
CI TI COURT, LLC 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: And I asked the -- the lady 
that brought the -- b rou ght it to me, the government 
official that brought it to me and handed it to me, I 
said, "Now, I want to make sure this is the real one, 
the latest one, the accurate one." 
I said, "I've already been in here once, I 
live, you know, an hour away both directions, so I 
want to make sure it's the real one." 
So she went back and searched again to see 
if she could find another one, and she came back to 
me and said, "No, this is the one. This is the 
latest map for the Lava Ridge Subdivision." 
So even though I had a realtor's license, 
that is something that they never taught us in real 
estate school. And so I didn't know that it had to 
have those signatures, honestly. 
afterwards. 
I didn't know until 
So in -- as far as I understood, I had 
done everyth i ng I could to get the right map from the 
State, that it was --
Q. 
THE COURT: Thank you, ma'am. 
THE WITNESS: Uh -huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: Go ahead, counsel. 
(By Mr. Horrocks) Okay. And so, 
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Ms. Thurgood, after you were able to get this second 
map, what did you do after that? 
A. Then I called the well, I called Patty, 
and I let her know that I had found it. And we 
talked about some o the r things, I'm sure . We always 
had a lot to talk about whenever we got on 
together. 
got 
And -- and then I started calling and 
asking for t he ut i l ity people to come and meet me at 
the property. So I met with t he telephone company. 
I met with th e water company there in Veyo . I met 
with the electric company, and I had each one of them 
tell me if it would work for us to put a home there 
on that site and if they would be able t o supply 
se rv ic es t o th a t site. And every one of them told me 
yes, t hat it would work. And so t ha t part of the due 
diligence was taken care of. 
Q, J ust to be clear, did you only speak on 





- - these people? 
I me t - - I asked them to meet me there, 
and every one of them came and me t me there. I find 
that it's a lot better to have them there in person 
so they can actually see the way it's set up . 
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Q. And so after meeting with all of these 
people, did you come to a conclusion as to the 
success you might have on the property? 
A. 
Q. 
I saw no red flags whatsoever. 
Okay. And did you advise your business 
partners of that conclusion? 
A. Brett and I were talking all the time, 
yeah. I did call him, and I told him that it looked 
like it was a go. 
THE COURT: Ms. Thurgood, counsel has put 
an umbrella over the relationship between yourself 
and Mr. Folkman as business partners. Was there a 
formal partnership of any kind, like a 
THE WITNESS: I'm confused what you mean. 
THE COURT: -- a partnership agreement 
signed or a limited liability company? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
liability company. 
THE COURT: So --
It is a limited 
THE WITNESS: And we' re both managers. 
THE COURT: Okay. High Desert Estates is 
a limited -- is an LLC? 
THE WITNESS: It i s . 
THE COURT: Okay. And the managers are 
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I asked if she would be interested in it. 
Okay. And then was it - - was it during 
this first phone call that she then had given you --
quoted you a price of 225,000, if you recall? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't remember. 
Okay. But you then arranged to meet 
Patricia at the property I believe the next day? 
Yes. A. 
Q. All right. So this next day, you then 





All right. She showed - - Ms. Arnett 




Okay. She -- although she also informed 
you during this first meeting that she had not had 




Okay. And you had mentioned at some point 
you were looking to put in a road, plus three houses 
on the land? 
A. That was - - that was Patty 's idea. I 
hadn't thought about how many we would put on, but 
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on it, just turning back around and sell it, or that 
we would put some homes on it. Whether we would put 
one, two, three, that just totally depended on what 
we found as we purs ued tha t option. 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. Now , there's a couple 
And a l so that we it may or may not have 
been part of the High Desert Estates. We -- we could 
ha ve the option of selling that separately from High 
Desert Estates, as long as there was an easement on 
it, o r putting homes on there as something separate. 
In fact, we -- I had talked to Brett about 
the fac t that he was having some difficulty finan - -
you know, getting the finances, and - - and I said, 
"We l l, maybe we could just build some homes on that 
lan d and sell it, and that would help give you some 
money to then go ahead and -- and have -- have the 
fin ances that you need." 
So it wasn't necessarily going to be put 
in with High Desert Estates, that was just one of the 
options we had. 
Q. Okay. And as part of the option that --
instead of referring to t he deposition, I guess it's 
just fair to say that it could have been one home , it 
could have been two homes, it could have been three 
homes. 
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purchase price down? 
A. Yes. In between the time that I met with 
Brett and the date of closing, I would say about two 
or three days before the date of closing, he called 
me and told me that the bank would not fund the full 
amount of 225 because it didn't appraise at that 
level. And that he had asked every neighbor, every 
relative that he could think of to come up with 
enough money to go through with the purchase, and 
that he had only been able to come up with -- I think 
the figure was 210,000. And he asked me if I was 
willing to change the final purchase price to 210 to 
move forward with closing the property. And I told 
him, no, I wasn't, that the exact amount was what I 
needed in order to fund the purchase that I was 
making, and that I had not approval for loan anymore 
than that. So I wanted to stick with the 225. 
MR. CALDWELL: Okay. No further 
questions. 
THE COURT: You may cross, counsel. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HEIDEMAN: 
Q. Ms. Arnett yesterday and in your 




























purposes that you understand the Thurgoods to be 




And those two purposes were an access as 




Now, you also testified that at no time 
were you ever told that this property was illegally 
subdivided prior to the 2009 conversation with 




And your testimony was that you didn't 
94 
know when you sold the property that it was illegally 
subdivided; is that correct? 
A. 
Q. 
That ' s correct. 
You also didn't 
reason to believe that they 
you didn't have any 
that the Thurgoods 
wouldn't be able to build on the property, correct? 
A. I didn't know, and that's why I told them 
to go to the county. 
Q. Okay. Well, my question is very specific. 
There was nothing that you were aware of that caused 
you to believe they could not build on that property; 
is that co r rect? 
A. Right. And I explained that to them. 
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Thurgood's own hand describes the property, first of 
a l l, "500 North l ot 6, Veyo Utah, (Lava Ridge 
Subdivision)," further desc r ibed as " LR " -- I'm 
pres umi ng that means Lav a Ridge, "-6-A northwest." 
And why it has "n orthwest" on it, I know not. There 
is no evidence on it, and it's not essential to the 
Court's analysis. And it is specified as 3.2 acres. 
Now, the Court is required to imply certain knowledge 
of process to the arm's length negotiations and 
acquisition of rea l estate. I can only look at this 
as arm's l ength because while counsel have both 
agreed that Mrs. Thurgood and Mr. Folkman are 
e xperienced real estate investors, Mrs . Arnett's 
testimony also shows to me that this isn't her first 
rodeo either. Even though she does trail rides and 
jum ping ho rses, she knows about real estate and was 
managing her mother's affairs and was cognisant of 
these things. 
In order to find a recision of this 
contract under either a mutual mistake of fact or a 
unilateral mistake of fact, the Court must find by 
clear and convincing evidence - - and I like 
Mr. Heideman's e xample of moving the majority of the 
ream of paper over to the other side, that's how the 





























and convincing evidence. The Court must find by 
clear and convincing evidence that the parties were 
not aware of the circumstances of this lot. The 
parties are impl i ed to know what the recording is in 
the county recorder's office when they are reasonably 
sophisticated real estate people. And I would call 
Mrs. Arnett a reasonably sophisticated real estate 
person and Ms. Thurgood and Mr. 
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Folkman. 
THE COURT: -- Folkman. You can change 
you r name here, Mr . Folkman, but you've got to pay a 
filing fee . 
Ms. Thurgood and Mr. Folkman are very 
sophisticated real estate investors. Because I'm 
required to find by clear and convincing evidence 
that t his was a mutual mistake of fact or at the very 
least a unilateral mistake of fact, I can't find it. 
I simply cannot. 
And the outcome of that is painful to me 
personally, and I'll tell you why. I have four 
people who are sitting here in my courtroom 
interested in the outcome of this case, and I find no 
guile amongst any of them. These are all good, 
hard-working, honest, forthright people who try to do 
their very best and try to make something of this 




























problem that seemed to be beyond their control and 
ended up in court hoping I could make something out 
of it. And the law simply does not allow me to do 
th is because I cannot rescind the contract, the 
burden of proof not having been met. What that means 
is that the contract stands; the deed of conveyance 
stands. And while I do find that the objective 
between the parties -- I only f in d it by a 
preponderance of the evidence, but it's very clear to 
me -- that the objective of Mr . Folkman and his 
mother-in - law was to get access plus real estate. 
That's very obvious. And that Mrs. Arnett was - - and 
Mrs. Arnett I refer to you as "Mrs." rather than 
"Ms." because you told me that you were married. And 
if you prefer "Ms.," I will change it. Do you prefer 
"Ms.," Ma'am? 
MS. ARNET T: It doesn't matter. 
THE COURT: I didn't think it would . But 
Ms. Arnett was understanding that it was accessed and 
then buildable because it's very clear that the first 
conversat ion by phone with Ms. Thurgood was for an 
easement. And then it went to outright purchase. 
And· the question became, as they walked the lot fr om 
west to east, how wide is it, can we build on it with 
the road still in place? If one or the other of 



























those predominates, I cannot so find. I think they 
were both equally important in the negotiations and 
the formations of this agreement . 
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When it comes to the price that is above 
the -- the set of the appraised value, I have two 
ways of looking at it. And again, it's the burden of 
proof that requires me to focus my wins on this 
analysis. If the va l ue is important in the 
resolution of the case, there aga i n I must find by 
clear and convincing evidence that the value supports 
the idea of a mutual mistaken fact . I cannot 
necessar i ly find that. Because while buildability of 
the lot, the ab i lity to get a permit, building 
permit, a septic permit , put a dwelling on the lot 
was extremely important to Mr. Folkman, in fact 
that's what he represented to the bank and I 
certain l y do not find any misrepresentation of what 
he said to the bank. Far to the contrary, I trust 
what he says. I have no reason to not believe what 
he says. While that was important, the fact that 
this was also a conduit for the development of the 
other property to the north for the overall real 
estate development that was contemplated back in 
2007, does not take the extra $50,000 so far out of 
reasonableness for me to be able to find by clear and 
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